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CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: 
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR A HEALTHY SUBDISCIPLINE
James K. A. Smith
Over the past decade there has been a burgeoning of work in philosophy 
of religion that has drawn upon and been oriented by “continental” sources 
in philosophy—associated with figures such as Martin Heidegger, Jacques 
Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Gilles Deleuze, and others. 
This is a significant development and one that should be welcomed by the 
community of Christian philosophers. However, in this dialogue piece I take 
stock of the field of “continental philosophy of religion” and suggest that the 
field is developing some un-healthy patterns and habits. The burden of the 
paper is to suggest a prescription for the future health of this important field 
by articulating six key practices that should characterize further scholarship 
in continental philosophy of religion.
Plato is a friend, but truth is a greater friend.
—Husserl’s marginal comment in his personal copy of 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit1
Over the past decade there has been a burgeoning of work in philosophy of 
religion that has drawn upon and been oriented by “continental” sources 
in philosophy—associated with figures such as Edmund Husserl, Martin 
Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Gilles 
Deleuze, Gianni Vattimo, and many others. One could identify the rum-
bling of this thirty years ago in Jean-Luc Marion’s landmark work, L’idole 
et la distance (1977) or in the earlier and influential work of Jewish philoso-
pher, Emmanuel Levinas.2 In fact, elements of such “continental” (or more 
specifically, phenomenological) engagements with religious phenomena 
can already be seen in Husserl and Heidegger.3 In North America, this 
1See “Husserl’s Marginal Remarks in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time,” 
trans. Thomas Sheehan, in Edmund Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phe-
nomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1997), p. 270. Heidegger’s Being and Time was dedicated to Husserl.
2For helpful discussion, see Jeffrey L. Kosky, Levinas and the Philosophy of Reli-
gion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001).
3Rudolf Schmitz-Perrin notes the religious motivation behind Husserl’s phe-
nomenology in “La phenomenology et ses marges religieuses: la correspondance 
d’Edmund Husserl,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 25 (1996), pp. 481–
488. For a helpful overview of the early Heidegger on these matters, see Merold 
CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 441
continental impetus has generated a lively discourse and secondary litera-
ture. One might suggest that the 1997 publication of John D. Caputo’s The 
Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida was something of a “coming out” party 
for a field or sub-discipline sometimes referred to as “continental philoso-
phy of religion”4—though such discourse had already been sustained in 
the work of Robert Sokolowski, Merold Westphal, Carl Raschke, Adriaan 
Peperzaak, Mark Taylor and others.5 And it has only continued to grow.
I think this is a significant development and one that should be wel-
comed by the community of Christian philosophers. Continental figures 
provide unique theoretical frameworks and resources for “faith seeking 
understanding”6 (not least because so many continental figures, such as 
Heidegger and Levinas, were significantly shaped by religious imagi-
nations, even if their relationship to religious institutions was tenuous). 
There are important resonances, for instance, between the hermeneutic 
tradition stemming from Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur and both 
Westphal, “Heidegger’s ‘Theologische Jugendschriften,’” Research in Phenomenology 
27 (1997), pp. 247–261.
4I have no stake in defending this nomenclature, and grant that the category of 
“continental” is contested. Nonetheless, I think the term has a heuristic value and 
it has become a standard reference. See, for instance, Philip Goodchild, “Continen-
tal Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction,” in Rethinking Philosophy of Religion: 
Approaches from Continental Philosophy, ed. Philip Goodchild (Bronx, NY: Fordham 
University Press, 2002), pp. 1–39; Explorations in Contemporary Continental Philoso-
phy of Religion, ed. Deane-Peter Baker and Patrick Maxwell (Dordrecht: Rodopi, 
2003); Merold Westphal, “Continental Philosophy of Religion” in The Oxford Hand-
book of Philosophy of Religion, ed. William J. Wainwright (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), pp. 472–493; Self and Other: Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion, 
ed. Eugene Thomas Long (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007) [a reprint of International 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 60, Nos. 1–3 (2006)]; and Nick Trakakis, “Me-
ta-Philosophy of Religion: The Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy of Reli-
gion,” Ars Disputandi [http://www.ArsDisputandi.org] 7 (2007), esp. §§45–57. Cp. 
also The Religious, Blackwell Readings in Continental Philosophy, ed. John D. Caputo 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).
5John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Reli-
gion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997); Robert Sokolowski, Eu-
charistic Presence: A Study in the Theology of Disclosure (Washington, DC: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1994); Merold Westphal, Overcoming Onto-Theology, 
Perspectives in Continental Philosophy (Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 
2001); Adriaan Peperzak, Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel 
Levinas for Philosophy, Literature, and Religion (London: Routledge, 1995). Without 
any hope of being comprehensive, one should also note the work of Carl Raschke, 
Charles Winquist, Mark C. Taylor and many others. See particularly Deconstruc-
tion and Theology, ed. Raschke (New York: Crossroad, 1982) and idem., ed., New 
Dimensions in Philosophical Theology (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982). One might 
argue, as Trakakis does (§46), that this flourishing of continental philosophy of 
religion represents the materialization of what Merold Westphal called for in an 
early essay, “Prolegomena To Any Future Philosophy of Religion Which Will Be 
Able to Come Forth as Prophecy,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 
(1973), pp. 129–150.
6Contra R. R. Reno, “Theology’s Continental Captivity,” First Things (April 
2006), pp. 26–33.
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Catholic theological emphases on the role of tradition and Reformed epis-
temology’s emphasis on “control beliefs” that govern knowing. Or Hus-
serl’s phenomenological framework provides helpful theoretical tools for 
considerations of religious experience.7 And of late, voices in European 
philosophy have turned their attention to specifically religious figures and 
texts: from Derrida’s engagements with Kierkegaard and Augustine, to 
Badiou’s and Agamben’s provocative readings of St. Paul.8
A scan of Faith and Philosophy or a skim of recent programs of the Society 
for Christian Philosophers might not (yet) indicate this, but this growing 
field has generated important alternative or specialized venues for schol-
arship and conversation.9 The Society for Continental Philosophy and The-
ology hosts stand-alone conferences and sessions in collaboration with the 
APA, ACPA, and SPEP.10 In addition, the American Academy of Religion is 
home to the Theology and Continental Philosophy Group. And meetings 
of the Society of Christian Philosophers at both the APA and AAR have 
been increasingly open to continental philosophy of religion. Work in con-
tinental philosophy of religion has appeared in leading (“mainstream”) 
journals such as Faith and Philosophy and International Journal for Philosophy 
of Religion,11 as well as journals such as Modern Theology and the Journal for 
Cultural Theory and Religious Theory.12 There are also several book series 
that have been primary venues for the field, particularly the Indiana Series 
in Philosophy of Religion (edited by Merold Westphal), Fordham Univer-
sity Press’s “Perspectives in Continental Philosophy” Series (edited by 
7In addition to Otto’s classic work, The Idea of the Holy, cp. more recent propos-
als in this vein such as James K. A. Smith, Speech and Theology: Language and the 
Logic of Incarnation (London: Routledge, 2002) and Anthony J. Steinbock, Phenom-
enology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2007).
8Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994); Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains: A Commentary on 
the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2005); Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. Ray Brassier 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
9Given that many programs which emphasize continental philosophy are 
housed in Catholic universities, one expects something different from the Ameri-
can Catholic Philosophical Association and the American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly. While both have long made room for phenomenology and existen-
tialism, I don’t think either have been host to much work in what we’re calling 
“continental philosophy of religion”—at least no more than the SCP and Faith 
and Philosophy. 
10For more info see http://www.scptonline.org. The fruit of SCPT conferences 
can be seen in books such as The Phenomenology of Prayer, ed. Bruce Ellis Benson 
and Norman Wirzba (Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 2005) and Transform-
ing Philosophy and Religion: Love’s Wisdom, ed. Norman Wirzba and Bruce Ellis Ben-
son, Indiana Series in Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2008).
11See Self and Other, ed. Long, for a selection of essays from IJPR. 
12The Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory has quickly become one of the pri-
mary hosts of conversations in continental philosophy of religion. It is published 
at http://www.jcrt.org.
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John D. Caputo), and most recently, the Columbia University Press series, 
“Insurrections: Critical Studies in Religion, Politics, and Culture” (edited 
by Slavoj Žižek, Clayton Crockett, Creston Davis, Jeffrey W. Robbins). 
Suffice it to say, continental philosophy of religion is a lively and grow-
ing field (one might be tempted to say “industry”). Furthermore, I think 
the field of continental philosophy of religion has enough of a history—
and certainly enough momentum—that some critical reflection on “the 
state of the field” is warranted. In this brief piece, intended to stimulate 
dialogue, I want to briefly and selectively take stock of the field of con-
tinental philosophy of religion and suggest that the field is developing 
some un-healthy patterns that threaten to compromise its viability as a 
properly scholarly conversation. In particular, I worry that the field is be-
coming increasingly insular, reactionary, and (ironically13) monolithic. 
The burden of this brief essay is to suggest a bit of a prescription for 
the future health of this important field.14 This is offered as an essay, and 
makes no claims to being comprehensive or exhaustive. Instead, it works 
from impressions of certain trends in the field as seen from the perspec-
tive of one immersed in the conversation. It is offered in the spirit of dia-
logue. In particular, I will address six areas of concern; more specifically, 
I will suggest that if continental philosophy of religion is to grow and 
advance—and be heard at the larger philosophical table—it is imperative 
that continental philosophers of religion develop six key habits or prac-
tices of scholarship.
1. Continental philosophers of religion should seek training and formation that 
is rigorous, pluralistic, and rooted in the history of philosophy. The shape of 
scholarship in continental philosophy of religion is, to some extent, an 
effect of the training that continental philosophers of religion receive. 
So if continental philosophy of religion exhibits worrisome patterns, we 
do well to consider the formation and education of those working in the 
field. That is, we need to carefully consider the shape of the “curriculum,” 
so to speak. In this respect, I think that some of the worst habits that are 
exhibited in continental philosophy of religion (insularity, a propensity to 
retreat to enclaves, and an ironic hostility to difference and critique) are 
to some extent products of graduate training that exhibit the same char-
acteristics. Some continental philosophers of religion receive training in 
departments of religious studies that lack rigorous structures of account-
13I say “ironically” because so much of continental philosophy is taken with 
the notion of “difference,” including continental philosophy of religion. And yet it 
seems to me that much of what we get in the name of difference is just more of the 
same; and in fact, the conversations tend to be inhospitable to approaches that call 
into question the regnant paradigms.
14In doing so, I don’t mean to take on the mantle of paternalistic physician 
(to which critics will no doubt reply, “Heal thyself!”). I recognize that even sug-
gesting this critique seems to put me in the position of someone who thinks they 
have “authority” to speak to “the field.” In fact, I don’t presume such (I resisted 
the temptation to title this “Advice to Continental Philosophers”!). Instead, as a 
practitioner invested in the field, I want merely to offer an anecdotal diagnosis of 
the field and suggest some practices in response. Both are offered in the spirit of 
“conversation starters.”
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ability in philosophy, particularly the history of philosophy; the result can 
sometimes be a kind of philosophy without accountability.15 Others (like 
myself) are trained in philosophy programs that are exclusively “conti-
nental” and thus insulated from (and often hostile to) broader discussions 
in (analytic) philosophy of religion. But it seems to me that philosophy of 
religion will profit from structures and education that brings together the 
resources and riches of both analytic and continental approaches. Granted, 
I think this also entails some revised habits and practices in analytic phi-
losophy of religion, which is de facto the majority culture in philosophy 
of religion and which would do well to find in continental philosophy 
of religion a partner in its work. But this should also be reciprocated: 
those engaged in continental philosophy of religion should be looking 
for training and formation that will enable them to engage philosophers 
of religion more broadly This will require both learning a sort of “second 
language” as well as a stance that sees analytic philosophy of religion as a 
legitimate project (though not impervious to critique). Such collaboration 
will not be well-served by caricatures or stereotypes from either side.16 
And it seems to me that graduate school—a particularly intense period 
of formation where deep-grained habits take hold—is the place to form 
good, generous habits of collaboration and conversation. This requires an 
environment, resources, and curriculum to sustain such formation.
I would suggest that continental philosophy of religion would be 
strengthened and deepened if those seeking training in the field matricu-
lated in graduate programs in philosophy that are intentionally pluralistic, 
providing training not only in continental philosophy but also the history of 
philosophy as well as the lingua franca of philosophy of religion today, which 
will require training in analytic philosophy as well. Graduate formation will 
be the first opportunity to enact study and conversation across the analytic-
continental divide. Those being formed in graduate programs of religion or 
religious studies would do well to enter programs and departments which 
have constructive relationships with philosophy departments.
15I owe this phrase to my colleague Lee Hardy (who, admittedly, was discuss-
ing much of the work that happens in “theory” programs in literature). 
16For example, I don’t think it is constructive to denigrate logical or proposi-
tional analysis as such, even if continental philosophers of religion will worry 
about a reductionism that sometimes attends such models. Consider, for instance, 
this take on the situation from John D. Caputo: “The talk about God and religion in 
contemporary continental philosophy bears almost no resemblance to what passes 
for traditional ‘philosophy of religion.’ The latter has typically concerned itself 
with offering proofs for the immortality of the soul and for the existence of God. 
. . . This tradition, which goes back to the scholastic debates of the high middle 
ages, is largely perpetuated today in the works of contemporary Anglo-American 
philosophers, who offer the old wine of metaphysical theology in the new bottles 
of analytic philosophy. . . . We on the continental side of this divide have sworn 
off that sort of thing” (Caputo, “Introduction” to The Religious, 2). Construals of 
the terrain in philosophy of religion such as John Caputo’s recent analysis are not 
particularly conducive to the kind of collaboration I’m suggesting here. Nor are 
they encouraged by the caricatures of postmodern thought proffered by, say, Al-
vin Plantinga in Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
pp. 422–437.
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2. Continental philosophers of religion should consistently submit their work to 
the rigors of peer-review and re-value the journal article as a central arena for 
discourse. Here my concern is the proliferation of edited volumes of essays 
that increasingly seem to be the publishing venue of choice in continental 
philosophy of religion.17 (And I say this as one who has both edited and 
contributed to such collections.) While such edited volumes are published 
by university presses and include important, constructive work, as can be 
the case in any field, the process of peer-review for such volumes seems 
to sometimes lack the same rigor and controls as journals.18 Instead, such 
collections tend to be repetitions of the usual suspects—and also tend to 
be quite predictable, merely new riffs on an established line. In addition, 
the proliferation of edited volumes results in the loss of any “center of 
gravity” for the conversation in continental philosophy of religion. Be-
cause discussions are sequestered in books, we lose the opportunity to 
cultivate journals as “go-to” venues for ongoing conversations (as, for in-
stance, Faith and Philosophy has ‘hosted’ ongoing discussions of Reformed 
epistemology, Religious Studies has been the go-to venue for discussion of 
miracles, etc.). Furthermore, edited volumes lack the opportunity for con-
tinuing a critical conversation that publication in peer-reviewed journals 
offers. Continental philosophers of religion would serve the conversation 
by submitting to the rigors (and frustrations!) of peer-reviewed, journal-
based publishing. 
3. Continental philosophers of religion should seek to publish their work in more 
“mainstream” channels. One of the most detrimental trends in continen-
tal philosophy of religion is a set of habits that encourages “preaching to 
the choir” (this is related to point 4 below). The field tends to retreat to 
enclaves, setting up alternative societies and meetings and publishing in 
“friendly” (read: “controlled”) venues. The result is a sectarian insularity: 
continental philosophers of religion talk only to themselves. Granted, I 
think the same is true in the majority culture of analytic philosophy of 
17See, for example, a number already cited (in notes 5 and 10) as well as Post-
Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology, ed. Philip Blond (London: 
Routledge, 1998); God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, ed. John D. Caputo and Michael 
J. Scanlon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999); Questioning God, ed. 
John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley, and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2001); Religion With/out Religion: The Prayers and Tears of John D. 
Caputo, ed. James H. Olthuis (London: Routledge, 2002); Religious Experience and 
the End of Metaphysics, ed. Jeffrey Bloechl (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2003); The Experience of God: A Postmodern Response, ed. Kevin Hart and Bar-
bara Wall (Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 2005); After God: Richard Kearney 
and the Religious Turn in Continental Philosophy, ed. John Panteleimon Manoussakis 
(Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 2006); and Transcendence and Phenomenol-
ogy, ed. Conor Cunningham and Peter M. Candler, Jr. (London: SCM Press, 2007).
18For instance, peer-review of edited volumes is almost never double-blind; fur-
thermore, it is more easily commandeered by networks of nepotism. (It’s difficult 
for me to be more specific about this without compromising the peer-review pro-
cess.) That said, I have no illusions about peer-review as some kind of guarantee 
for quality scholarship. Granted, analytic philosophy is not immune to problems 
in this regard.
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religion, which is usually just as insulated from dissenting voices. The 
result on both sides is a kind of tribal insularity. As a result, they often 
encounter little resistance or critique—a state of affairs that is generally 
detrimental to good scholarship. But equally importantly, by working and 
publishing in such enclaves, continental philosophers of religion are also 
missing opportunities to encounter, challenge, and contribute to broader 
conversations in philosophy of religion.
By seeking to present their work in venues that are more broadly con-
stituted (regional meetings of the Society of Christian Philosophers, the 
Philosophy of Religion Section of the AAR, etc.), and by aiming to pub-
lish in more mainstream journals (such as Faith and Philosophy, Religious 
Studies, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, etc.), continental 
philosophers of religion will both open themselves to critique (which is 
a scholarly virtue) and create opportunities to contribute to the field as a 
whole (including the opportunity to critique regnant paradigms on their 
own turf, rather than getting away with caricatured critiques within a safe 
enclave that is little more than an echo chamber).19 This will require do-
ing some translation work, relinquishing the ease and comfort of in-house 
jargon, but without requiring that we relinquish the unique “genius” of 
continental sources and traditions of inquiry.20
4. Continental philosophers of religion should move beyond the “essay” and take 
responsibility for literature review as integral to their work. As a continental 
philosopher of religion, I must confess to one facet of “analytic envy”: I 
have been deeply impressed by the tight sense of the “state of the field” 
that characterizes certain subfields of analytic philosophy. In particu-
lar, conversations in analytic philosophy always begin with a literature 
review that considers the status quaestionis for a particular question or 
problem. Every article must make an original contribution to the field, 
and in order to make an original contribution it needs to (a) take account 
of all earlier, relevant contributions and (b) make an argument that ad-
vances this contribution. Granted, for many philosophers this is standard 
practice. But I have been struck by the common absence of such a practice 
in continental philosophy of religion. In particular, “essays” in continen-
tal philosophy of religion offer “new” perspectives that often fail to take 
19My criticism of certain trends in continental philosophy of religion is by no 
means intended to give a “free pass” to analytic philosophy of religion. Nor am I 
suggesting that continental philosophy of religion would “get it right” if it would 
just get in line with the analytic school. I have articulated a different critique of 
trends in analytic philosophy of religion in James K. A. Smith, “Philosophy of 
Religion Takes Practice: Liturgy as Source and Method in Philosophy of Religion,” 
in Contemporary Practice and Method in Philosophy of Religion: New Essays, ed. David 
Cheetham and Rolfe King (London: Continuum, 2008), pp. 133–147.
20When I review (and, sadly, often reject) “continental” articles for various 
philosophy of religion journals, I usually point authors to the work of Merold 
Westphal as an exemplar of just what I’m describing here. For just two examples, 
see Merold Westphal, “Taking Plantinga Seriously,” Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999), 
pp. 173–181; and idem., “Christian Philosophers and the Copernican Revolution,” 
in Christian Perspectives on Religious Knowledge, ed. C. Stephen Evans and Merold 
Westphal (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), pp. 161–179.
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account of either (a) earlier contributions that make the same argument 
or (b) earlier arguments that have already demonstrated the paucity or 
faulty nature of the supposedly “new” contribution. Continental philoso-
phy of religion could be revolutionized if we would just adopt the lit-
erature review as a standard procedure—and if the peer-review process 
required this for publication. 
5. Continental philosophers of religion should move beyond “victimhood” and 
embrace critique. Continental philosophers of religion—like “continental 
philosophers” in general—tend to construe certain types of criticism of 
their work as a kind of persecution for their “continental” commitments. 
As such, we tend to assume a “victim” mentality—which then drives our 
retreat into insulated enclaves and the comfort of the choir. Granted, the 
philosophical establishment in North America is governed by “analytic” 
practices and assumptions. And I would also grant that, at times, this 
does translate into biases and prejudices that ideologically reject conti-
nental discourse. However, not all critique is ideologically-driven; some 
of it is philosophically warranted. And continental philosophers should 
welcome that kind of critique, for it is philosophical critique that advances 
the field.
6. Continental philosophy of religion should encourage authentic pluralism. De-
spite mantras of “difference,” I have been struck by a creeping hegemony 
in contemporary continental philosophy of religion. The field has devel-
oped an oddly monolithic flavor—one that tends to be dominated by a 
particular version of “religion” or spirituality that is allergic to the deter-
minate religious institutions and traditions. In most cases this stems from 
a certain Derridean understanding of “religion without religion,” but it 
can also be informed by the work of Vattimo or others.21 Philosophies of 
religion that would be more properly Catholic are almost ruled out of 
court; indeed, they will be considered “unorthodox” vis-à-vis the regnant 
orthodoxy of “religion without religion” or “secular” theology.22 But such 
a narrow and monolithic construal of the field is debilitating for the con-
21Other streams are developing, including work in philosophy of religion in dia-
logue with non-phenomenological figures such as Deleuze, Žižek, and Badiou.
22For instance, nothing raises the hackles of continental philosophers of religion 
more than Radical Orthodoxy. See, for instance, Clayton Crockett’s “Introduction” 
to Religion and Violence in a Secular World, ed. Clayton Crockett (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2006), pp. 10–13; John D. Caputo, “What Do I Love 
When I Love My God? Deconstruction and Radical Orthodoxy,” in Questioning 
God, ed. John D. Caputo, Michael Scanlon, and Mark Dooley (Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press, 2001), pp. 291–317, and the recent exchange between Eliza-
beth Castelli and Graham Ward in Journal of the American Academy of Religion 74 
(2006), pp. 179–193. The one thing that is heterodox for continental philosophy of 
religion is orthodoxy. I hope to elsewhere encourage a constructive dialogue on 
this point. See also my concerns expressed in “The Logic of Incarnation: Towards 
a Catholic Postmodernism,” in The Logic of Incarnation: James K. A. Smith’s Critique 
of Postmodern Religion, ed. Neal DeRoo and Brian Lightbody (Eugene, OR: Wipf & 
Stock, 2009), pp. 3–37. 
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versation. Continental philosophers of religion should seek to encourage a 
bigger tent and foster a genuine pluralism within the field. 
My sense and hope is that the field of continental philosophy of reli-
gion is healthy enough to absorb critical discussion of our own habits and 
practices. This dialogue essay is offered as a means to get the conversa-
tion started, with the hope and desire of strengthening an important field 
within philosophy of religion.
Calvin College
